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THE PROJECT
The philosophy of international law is blooming. While more and more international 
lawyers, especially in the newer generation, are starting to address philosophical 
questions about the nature of international law and its legitimacy, moral and politi-
cal philosophers have long discussed international law and institutions.1 What has 
been slow in coming, however, is for legal philosophers, and especially those in the 
Anglo-American analytical tradition, to venture beyond the safe ground of tradi-
tional state-related jurisprudence and apply their mind to international law and its 
philosophical specificities.2 While things are starting to change,3 there is a dearth 
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1 See eg Allen Buchanan, ‘International Law, Philosophy of’ in Edward Craig (ed), Routledge Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 2006), www.rep.routledge.com/article/T070SECT4; Allen Buchanan, 
Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2004); Fernando Tesón, A Philosophy of International Law (Westview, 1998). For a discussion of 
the contribution of moral philosophies of international law to the legal philosophy of international 
law, see Samantha Besson, ‘Moral Philosophy and International Law’ in Florian Hoffmann and Anne 
Orford (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
2 See also Jeremy Waldron, ‘International Law: “A Relatively Small and Unimportant Part” of Juris-
prudence?’, NYU School of Law Public Law Research Paper no 13-56 (October 2013) 222–3, http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2326758 or http://dx.doirg/10.2139/ssrn.2326758: ‘What we miss is what might 
have been done.’
3 See eg William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2010); Detlef von Daniels, The Concept of Law from a Transnational 
Perspective (Ashgate, 2010); Michael Giudice and Keith Culver, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General 
Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 2010); Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophi-
cal Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2012); Liam Murphy, What Makes Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) ch 8: ‘What Makes Law Law? Law Beyond the State’.
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of in-depth jurisprudential reflection about international law. This is particularly 
the case with the legitimacy or legitimate authority of international law.4 In this 
context, Nicole Roughan’s dissertation-turned-monograph is a long-awaited first 
book-length contribution to the debate. And no doubt, given its qualities, will it 
remain a reference for many years to come. 
The book’s starting point is the interaction between national, international and 
transnational law and the involved overlapping and sometimes conflicting claims 
to authority. The question the author asks is ‘whether, and if so how, plurality of 
authority and relationships between authorities affect or even effect the existence 
and legitimacy of authority’ (5). According to Roughan, ‘the key theoretical puz-
zle generated by circumstances of plurality’ ‘is not plurality of law in itself, but 
confusion over law’s authority’ (3). In reaction to this puzzle, the book aims at 
bringing together two discussions that have too often taken place separately: schol-
arly debates pertaining to the plurality of law that are not sufficiently familiar with 
theories of authority, and theoretical discussions of authority that have not paid 
enough attention to the circumstances of plurality (60). The book actually endeav-
ours to contribute to both fields of enquiry at the same time: ‘although theories of 
authority help us understand and evaluate relationships between authorities, the 
practice of plural authority also has implications for understanding what authority 
is and when it is justified’ (3). 
The book’s argument is that existing, state-based conceptions of authority can-
not be sustained wherever there are multiple authorities sharing or competing 
for domains, generating difficulties of ranking or identifying authorities. Instead, 
Roughan suggests that we should understand authority in pluralist circumstances 
as ‘relative authority’ and devise a new theory of its legitimacy to go with it. The 
new theory proposed in the book includes in particular revising the idea that law 
claims to have exclusive legitimate authority. The theory is two-pronged. First of all, 
with respect to the grounds of authority, the ‘plurality of authority, and the relation-
ships that exist between holders of authority, must be built into any justification of 
authority’ (5–6). Secondly, with respect to the conditions of legitimate authority, 
authority is best conceived of as ‘a relative power’, whether it is ‘shared’ in the 
‘same domain’ or ‘mutually dependent’ in ‘interactive domains’, and the relation-
ships between these ‘relative authorities’ should amount to ‘a relativity condition 
upon their legitimacy’ (6).
Roughan’s book is well structured and a pleasure to read. It covers a lot of 
ground and literature, but its line of argument remains clear throughout. It suc-
ceeds in engaging with arguments on all sides of the debate (7) and, in return, its 
claims should be equally easy to relate to for legal scholars working on issues of 
legal pluralism and by legal philosophers interested in the authority of law beyond 
the state.
4 There have been exceptions, however; see eg Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: 
A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15(5) European Journal of International Law 907; 
Samantha Besson, ‘The Authority of International Law: Lifting the State Veil’ (2009) 31(3) Sydney 
Law Review 343; Allen Buchanan, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ in Besson and Tasioulas (n 
3) 79; John Tasioulas, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ in Besson and Tasioulas (n 3) 97.
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THE ARGUMENT
The book is comprised of 13 chapters divided into four parts. The first chapter 
functions as an introduction to the book. It presents the aim and structure of the 
book, outlines its argument and makes a few preliminary clarifications.
The first part of the book consists of three chapters pertaining to the two key 
concepts in the book: authority and plurality. There, Roughan defines legitimate 
authority (chapter 2), explains what she means by the plurality of authorities and 
their cooperative or conflicting relationships (chapter 3), and assesses the state of 
the discussion in legal theory (chapter 4). The upshot of this first part of the book 
is that existing accounts of legal authority ‘do not adequately address the puzzles 
raised by plurality of authority’ and, in particular, cannot explain whether ‘plural-
ity of legitimate authority is conceptually possible, and/or how different types of 
coordinated, cooperative or conflicting relationships can be explained’ (9).
The second part of the book is comprised of two chapters that take up differ-
ent puzzles raised by plural authority for existing theories of legitimate authority. It 
focuses mostly on Joseph Raz’s theory of authority, ‘which presents both the most 
promise and the biggest challenge for explaining plurality of authority’ (9), but also 
on Jeremy Waldron’s variation of Razian authority. In chapter 5, Roughan argues 
that ‘neither theorist adequately addresses the impact of plurality upon the prac-
tice of public authority, especially when such plurality occurs among disjunctive 
authorities’ (9). Chapter 6 identifies two problems for Raz’s normal justification 
thesis in case of conflicting authorities and obligations: ‘problems of ranking and 
identification’ (9). The effect of this second part is that Razian authority ‘is not 
complete or conclusive for explaining plurality of authority’ (10).
The third part of the book consists of three chapters that constitute the core 
of the book’s argument and articulate its pluralist conception of authority: ‘rela-
tive authority’. Chapter 7 argues for a conjunctive justification of authority, ie a 
combination of procedural and substantive justifications. This is both a general 
argument and one that aims at addressing ‘the puzzles raised by plurality’ (10). To 
enable the proposed conception of authority to respond to the intractability of the 
identification and ranking of conflicting authorities, chapter 8 proposes to add a 
‘relativity condition’ for the justification of authority that entails that ‘where there 
is relative authority (either in a single or in interacting domains), the authorities 
concerned must engage in appropriate relationships with one another if they are 
to enjoy legitimate authority’ (10). In chapter 9, Roughan argues that the law’s 
claim to authority should be ‘reconceived as a claim to relative authority’ and that 
this implies not only openness to other systems of law, but also responsiveness to 
them (10). The conclusion of part three is that the account of relative authority 
defended may serve as a building block for ‘pluralist jurisprudence’, ‘by offering a 
theory of law’s authority that replaces supremacy and exclusivity with relativity and 
relationships’ (10).
The fourth and final part of the book comprises four chapters that focus on the 
implications of the proposed conception of relative authority in three legal contexts 
that demonstrate pluralist features: international and transnational law (chapter 
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10); European Union (EU) law (chapter 11); and infranational law (chapter 12). 
It closes with a case-study on the Crown-Maori relationships in New Zealand, a 
testimony to the origins of the author and an illustration of the analysis of relative 
authority within the state presented in chapter 12 (chapter 13). A common feature 
to all four chapters is that they apply the proposed theory of relative authority to 
different legal contexts and show how it sheds light on some of the existing con-
troversies in each area. They are ‘intended to be food for further thought’ rather 
than ‘complete analyses’ (11) and should not be understood as developments in 
the argument presented in the third part of the book. Nor are they meant to pro-
vide prescriptive solutions to conflicts of authority or suggestions for institutional 
reform (6).
TWO CRITIQUES
Roughan’s book may be read as a contribution to the legal philosophy of authority 
in circumstances of legal plurality in general (chapters 7–9), but also in specific 
pluralistic contexts such as the European Union, transnational law or infranational 
law (chapters 10–13) (6–7). The focus of this review will be on its contribution to 
the legal philosophy of authority of international law and the latter’s relationship 
to domestic law (chapter 10). 
There are two critiques I would like to make and that correspond to the two 
steps in the book’s argument: the first one pertains to Roughan’s understanding 
of the circumstances of legal plurality and the second to the conception of relative 
authority she proposes.
First of all, the pluralist circumstances of law. There are three points to make here.
To start with, the book embraces a broad notion of the pluralist features of 
law that pertains to objects as variable as legal norms, regimes, orders and systems, 
on the one hand, and encompasses relationships as variable as the concurrence, 
interaction and potential conflict between those various legal entities, on the other 
(1, 7, 44–48). While the fact that it is inclusive of as many legal relationships as 
possible—and hence can be applied, in the fourth part of the book, equally to 
international law, transnational law, EU law and infranational law—is actually a 
quality and strength of the argument, it also amounts to a weakness at the same 
time. Indeed, the argument mostly remains at a very high level of generality, and is 
sometimes difficult to follow as a result. More regrettably, the indeterminacy about 
the object of plurality enables the author to make the strong claim that relations 
between legal ‘systems’ themselves may be put on a par with other normative rela-
tions of authority within a legal system (155); that since authority is ‘relative’, legal 
systems should be as well; and that, as a result, the question of the existence of 
distinct legal systems is the wrong question to ask (149–50).
Take international law, for instance. Here, the questions not only of the exist-
ence of a legal system and of its relationship to the domestic legal systems, but 
also of the various ‘regimes’ within that ‘system’ and of their autonomy, remain 
hugely controversial. Ignoring those questions and the theories thereof at the stage 
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of qualification of the legal practice threaten its normative assessment from the 
perspective of the theory of authority later in the book. Assuming too readily a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ pluralist description of the practice of international law that strad-
dles all norms, sources and regimes, all subject matters and all types of normative 
relationships within international law and with domestic law can only be mislead-
ing. It is actually particularly telling that most international lawyers who are familiar 
with arguments of legal pluralism and actually endorse them in other contexts do 
not apply it to qualify the practice of international law. Of course, Roughan is right: 
those issues are inherently related to issues of authority and legitimacy (150).5 
However, reducing them to the latter is just as problematic as ignoring the latter in 
the first place.
The second issue I have with the book’s qualification of the practice of law is 
that it discusses interchangeably the plurality of law and that of institutions apply-
ing and making that law. This assimilation then translates into the interchangeable 
reference to ‘authorities’ and institutions having ‘authority’ (28), on the one hand, 
and to the authority of law itself (1), on the other. Of course, the book’s account 
of authority is institutional and factors in institutional and procedural justifications 
of authority (27–29, 126–8). The problem is rather that it assumes too readily that 
institutions and law always go hand in hand and does not explain, when they do, 
how institutional and legal authority actually relate.
To come back to international law, one of its features is precisely that many of 
its legal norms are not applied by international institutions. As a matter of fact, 
they are mostly applied by domestic ones.6 One may even argue that some inter-
national legal norms are made through domestic law-making processes or, at least, 
together with domestic ones in a transnational fashion (eg customary international 
law norms or international human rights courts’ interpretations).7 In other cases, 
on the contrary, international legal norms are applied and sometimes even made 
by too many international institutions at the same time (eg multiple international 
courts). This characteristic disjunction between law and institutions is arguably key 
to understanding the authority of international law, therefore, but goes amiss in 
the proposed account.
A third and final difficulty resides in the nature and hence in the order of 
questions. The author claims that the pluralist ‘practice’ of law raises a puzzle for 
existing ‘theories’ of legal authority. The way she understands the pluralist features 
of the practice, however, already implies a given understanding of (normative) 
5 See also Samantha Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’ in Besson and Tasioulas (n 
3) 163 on the relationship between the validity and the legitimacy of international law.
6 In this respect, Roughan (175–8) misunderstands the argument made in Besson (n 4) 373–4. My 
point was precisely to show that states do not (only) act as subjects of the authority of international 
law, but most of the time as officials (‘authorities’ in Roughan’s terms) and hence both as subjects of 
authority and sources of authority (see 80). Note that depending on whether it is the law or the insti-
tution that exercises authority in this context, the authority will be either international or domestic 
or both. 
7 See eg Samantha Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law: Patterns of Mutual Validation and 
Legitimation’ in Matthew Liao and Massimo Renzo (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015).
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authority, ie the very exclusive understanding she suggests we should reject in the 
second half of her argument. Not only does this approach pre-empt some of the 
possible objections to the argument by making the latter the answer to a (con-
structed) puzzle in the practice,8 but, conversely, it also prevents the reader from 
approaching conflicts of authority (43–44) (what Roughan actually also describes 
interchangeably as the ‘plurality of law’ (1)) not so much as a challenge but as a 
justified feature of the practice of law (together with other features of the practice 
that need to be accounted for, such as the principles of primacy or subsidiarity). 
The root difficulty, I think, is that legal plurality cannot be treated in this ontologi-
cal fashion;9 it reflects a normative reading of law and hence an understanding of 
the law’s normativity and, accordingly, of its authority—both claimed and justified. 
In fact, Roughan seems to accept this claim—albeit only through the distinction 
between legal pluralism and legal plurality (2 fn 3, 44, 69) and hence through the 
relationship between legal pluralism itself and relative authority (146).10 Curiously, 
however, she does not see its implications for the first descriptive, ontological or 
even ‘phenomenological’ step in her argument (3, 7, 44, 155).
Second, the conception of relative authority. The book argues that existing concep-
tions of the authority of law, and especially Razian authority, are not—or at least 
are not sufficiently—relative. The question, of course, depends on what is meant 
by relativity. Despite the author’s efforts at distinguishing various meanings thereof 
(137–8), I am not sure her use of the term is rigorous enough.11 Or that it is actu-
ally the right term for what she has in mind. What she wants to say, I think, is that 
law is inherently relational, and that its authority qua authority within a normative 
relationship cannot but be relational as a result. This is particularly important if 
one focuses not so much on the different sources of authority but on its (shared) 
subjects and regards them as pivotal to the justifications and hence also to the allo-
cation of authority, as I did elsewhere and as Roughan does as well (26–27). This 
comes out even more clearly if one’s account of legal authority is also political and 
democratic in nature.12 There is nothing here, however, that cannot be explained 
within a Razian account of authority. To that extent, the conjunctive justifications 
of the authority model proposed by Roughan are not so different from those pro-
posed in revised Razian accounts of the justifications of authority and especially 
from public and democratic ones.13
8 See eg the discussion on 47–48 and then on 48–59 and the circularity it embraces between the 
description of the plurality of law qua plurality of authorities and the later argument about relative 
authority and its justifications and conditions (eg 137–42).
9 See eg Samantha Besson, ‘The Truth about Legal Pluralism’, Review of Nico Krisch’s Beyond Constitu-
tionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2012) 8(2) European Constitutional Law Review 354.
10 As a matter of fact, even those distinctions are not always consistent: see eg the discussions on 155, 
163.
11 Sometimes, the term ‘relative’ is used as the opposite of ‘autonomous’ (or ‘binary’ (15)), but at 
other times as the opposite of ‘independent’ (or ‘singular’ (8, 42, 138)) or ‘exclusive’ (or ‘monist’ 
(8, 15, 149)).
12 The question of ‘popular sovereignty’, though, is curiously—and regrettably—excluded from the 
scope of the book’s argument on ‘public authority’ (14).
13 See eg Jeremy Waldron, ‘Authority for Officials’ in Lukas Meyer et al (eds), Rights, Culture and the 
Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press, 2003) 45; Bes-
son (n 4).
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Furthermore, because it is likely that there will be more than one normative 
relationship at a time to any given subject, authority is necessarily also about pre-
empting or excluding other reasons and hence other normative relations from 
applying. As a matter of fact, the claim to supremacy in authority is only under-
standable if authority is deemed inherently relational in this way. It is the point 
of legal authority to help set priorities between applicable reasons and, by exten-
sion, between normative relations that give rise to those reasons, whether they 
are moral or legal and arise from this or that legal source, regime or order. And 
the principles guiding those priorities in authority in case of conflict or interac-
tion derive from those underpinning the (inherently relational) justifications of 
authority in the first place. Again, there is nothing here that cannot be explained 
within a Razian account of authority. Coordination (including of authorities), one 
of Roughan’s examples (144), is an established ground of (relational) authority in 
such accounts.14 And it is even more so if one’s conception of legal authority is also 
political and democratic in nature and our vantage point is that of the (shared) 
subjects to multiple legal orders: the egalitarian dimension of public authority 
implies sorting relations of law and authority according to the (relation of) equality 
of its subjects and, arguably, therefore to subsidiarity.15 To that extent, the relativ-
ity condition to legitimacy proposed by Roughan (provided ‘conditionality’ is the 
right term in this context and it is not entirely clear to me that it is) and the idea 
of the ‘appropriateness’ of the relations between authorities are not absent from 
revised Razian accounts of legitimacy, and especially public and democratic ones.16
Take international law and its relations to domestic law once more. In practice, 
the principle of supremacy or primacy of international law plays an important role 
in the latter’s relations to domestic law’s authority over the same subjects. It is not 
specific, however, as to the exact rank it should have over parts of domestic law that 
claim enhanced democratic authority. This should not come as a surprise given that 
democracy and democratic authority are themselves requirements of international 
law, thus indicating some element of relational authority in the authority claimed 
by international law itself. The same may be said, albeit with different results, of 
EU law that aims at ‘integrating’ domestic law. There, by contrast, the claim to 
primacy of EU law includes taking priority over domestic constitutional law, but 
this should come as no surprise since it comes hand in hand with a requirement of 
democratic legitimacy on the part of the EU itself and a principle of subsidiarity in 
the implementation of EU law. So, the problem with the authority of international 
law is not the claim to primacy—on the contrary, that claim is inherent in the idea 
of legal authority qua relational authority—but not understanding how inherently 
14 See Besson (n 4) 357. To that extent, Roughan’s distinction between relationships ‘between authori-
ties’ and ‘of authority’ (12) is not convincing. She actually fails to comply entirely with it herself, as 
exemplified in her discussion of the relativity condition and of the idea of justifying ‘authority’ itself 
on grounds of an ‘inter-authority’ relationship (137–42).
15 In this respect, Roughan (80) misunderstands the argument made in Besson (n 4) 371–2. My point 
was precisely to show that because the subjects of those multiple sources of authority are the same, 
their justifications cannot but relate and be sorted by reference to one another from the standpoint 
of those (shared) subjects—albeit objectively, of course. 
16 See eg Waldron (n 13); Besson (n 4).
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relational that claim is and how it may have different implications depending on 
the contexts of legal authority.
Of course, and Roughan is right about this (185–8), there are areas in inter-
national law where primacy is not the principle favoured by international law and 
where what I have referred to elsewhere as ‘mutual legitimation’ takes place.17 
The norms concerned in those cases are, however, quite special: they are norms 
of legitimation themselves, such as democracy and human rights in particular. In 
any case, it is the making of those norms and their legitimation in the making that 
are mutual. Once applied, they benefit from the primacy claimed by this kind of 
‘transnational’ international law over domestic law. One more reason not to put 
too readily all of international law, and generally law tout court, in the same ‘plural-
ist’ basket.18
Nothing in the two critiques I have articulated should be read as taking any-
thing away from the many other unique qualities of the book. It is an outstanding 
contribution to the philosophy of international law and should be at the top of the 
reading list of anyone interested in the authority of law within and beyond the state.
17 See Besson (n 7).
18 See Samantha Besson, ‘Human Rights Pluralism in Europe’ in Kaarlo Tuori and Miguel Maduro 
(eds), Transnational Law: Rethinking Legal Thinking (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 170.
